Introduction {#Sec1}
============

It is a common economic phenomenon in competitions that agents make irreversible investments without knowing the outcome. *All-pay* auctions are widely used in economics to capture such situations, where all players, even the losers, pay their bids. For example, a lobbyist can make a monetary contribution in order to influence decisions made by the government. Usually the group invested the most increases their winning chances, but all groups have to pay regardless of the outcome. In addition, all-pay auctions have been shown useful to model rent seeking, political campaigns and R&D races. There is a well-known connection between all-pay auctions and *contests* \[[@CR21]\]. In particular, the all-pay auction can be viewed as a single-prize contest, where the payments correspond to the effort that players make in order to win the competition.

In this paper, we study the efficiency of mixed Nash equilibria in all-pay auctions with complete information, from a worst-case analysis perspective, using the *price of anarchy* \[[@CR16]\] as a measure. As social objective, we consider the *social welfare*, i.e. the sum of the bidders' valuations. We study the equilibria induced from all-pay mechanisms in three fundamental resource allocation scenarios; combinatorial auctions, multi-unit auctions and single-item auctions.

In a combinatorial auction, a set of items are allocated to a group of selfish individuals. Each player has different preferences for different subsets of the items and this is expressed via a *valuation set* function. A multi-unit auction can be considered as an important special case, where there are multiple copies of a single good. Hence the valuations of the players are not set functions, but depend only on the number of copies received. Multi-unit auctions have been extensively studied since the seminal work by Vickrey \[[@CR24]\]. As already mentioned, all-pay auctions have received a lot of attention for the case of a single item, as they model all-pay contests and procurements via contests.

Contribution {#Sec2}
------------

*Combinatorial Auctions* Our first result is on the price of anarchy of simultaneous all-pay auctions with item-bidding that was previously studied by Syrgkanis and Tardos \[[@CR23]\]. For fractionally subadditive valuations, it was previously shown that the price of anarchy was at most 2 \[[@CR23]\] and at least $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$e/(e-1)\approx 1.58$$\end{document}$ \[[@CR8]\]. We narrow further this gap, by improving the upper bound to 1.82. In order to obtain the bound, we come up with several structural theorems that characterize mixed Nash equilibria in simultaneous all-pay auctions.

*Multi-Unit Auctions* Our next result shows a novel use of all-pay mechanisms to the multi-unit setting. We propose an all-pay mechanism with a randomized allocation rule inspired by Kelly's seminal proportional-share allocation mechanism \[[@CR15]\]. We show that this mechanism admits a *unique*, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$75\%$$\end{document}$ efficient *pure* Nash equilibrium and no other mixed Nash equilibria exist, when bidders' valuations are submodular. As a consequence, the price of anarchy of our mechanism outperforms all current price of anarchy bounds of mixed Nash equilibria in prevalent multi-unit auctions including uniform price auction \[[@CR18]\] and discriminatory auction \[[@CR14]\], where the bound is $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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*Single-Item Auctions* Finally, we study the efficiency of a single-prize contest that can be modeled as a single-item all-pay auction. We show a tight bound on the price of anarchy for mixed Nash equilibria which is approximately 1.185. By following previous study on the procurement via contest, we further study two other standard objectives, *revenue* and *maximum bid*. We evaluate the performance of all-pay auctions in the prior-free setting, i.e. no distribution over bidders' valuation is assumed. We show that both the revenue and the maximum bid of any mixed Nash equilibrium are at least as high as $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$v_2$$\end{document}$ is the second highest valuation. In contrast, the revenue and the maximum bid in some mixed Nash equilibrium may be less than $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$v_2/2$$\end{document}$ when using reward structure other than allocating the entire reward to the highest bidder. This result coincides with the optimal crowdsourcing contest developed in \[[@CR6]\] for the setting with prior distributions. We also show that in conventional procurements (modeled by first-price auctions), $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$v_2$$\end{document}$ is exactly the revenue and maximum bid in the worst equilibrium. So procurement via all-pay contests is a 2-approximation to the conventional procurement in the context of worst-case equilibria.

Related Work {#Sec3}
------------

The inefficiency of Nash equilibria in auctions has been a well-known fact (see e.g. \[[@CR17]\]). Existence of efficient equilibria of simultaneous sealed bid auctions in full information settings was first studied by Bikhchandani \[[@CR3]\]. Christodoulou et al.  \[[@CR7]\] initiated the study of the (Bayesian) price of anarchy of simultaneous auctions with item-bidding. Several variants have been studied since then \[[@CR2], [@CR10]--[@CR12]\], as well as multi-unit auctions \[[@CR14], [@CR18]\]. Recently, Feldman, Lucier and Nisan showed that, in first-price single-item auctions, correlated equilibria are always efficient and the price of anarchy of coarse equilibria is exactly $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Syrgkanis and Tardos \[[@CR23]\] proposed a general smoothness framework for several types of mechanisms and applied it to settings with fractionally subadditive bidders obtaining several upper bounds (e.g., first price auction, all-pay auction, and multi-unit auction). Christodoulou et al. \[[@CR8]\] constructed tight lower bounds for first-price auctions and showed a tight price of anarchy bound of 2 for all-pay auctions with subadditive valuations. Roughgarden \[[@CR20]\] presented an elegant methodology to provide price of anarchy lower bounds via a reduction from the hardness of the underlying optimization problems.

All-pay auctions and contests have been studied extensively in economic theory. Baye et al. \[[@CR1]\], fully characterized the Nash equilibria in single-item all-pay auction with complete information. The connection between all-pay auctions and crowdsourcing contests was proposed in \[[@CR9]\]. Chawla et al. \[[@CR6]\] studied the design of optimal crowdsourcing contest to optimize the maximum bid in all-pay auctions when agents' value are drawn from a specific distribution independently.

Preliminaries {#Sec4}
=============

In a *combinatorial auction*, *n* *players* compete on *m* *items*. Every player (or *bidder*) $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$v_i: \{0,1\}^m \rightarrow {\mathbb {R}}^+$$\end{document}$ which is monotone and normalized, that is, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$v_i(\emptyset )=0.$$\end{document}$ The outcome of the auction is represented by a tuple of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\mathbf {X}=(X_1,\ldots , X_n)$$\end{document}$ specifies the allocation of items ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$X_i$$\end{document}$ is the set of items allocated to player *i*) and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\mathbf {p}=(p_1,\ldots ,p_n)$$\end{document}$ specifies the buyers' payments ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$p_i$$\end{document}$ is the payment of player *i* for the allocation $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\mathbf {X}$$\end{document}$). In the *simultaneous item-bidding* auction, every player $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$j\in [m].$$\end{document}$ The items are then allocated by independent auctions, i.e. the allocation and payment rule for item *j* only depend on the players' bids on item *j*. In a simultaneous *all-pay* auction the allocation and payment for each player is determined as follows: each item $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$i^* = \arg \max _{i}b_{ij}$$\end{document}$, and each bidder *i* is charged an amount equal to $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$p_{i}=\sum _{j\in [m]}b_{ij}$$\end{document}$. It is worth mentioning that, for any bidder profile, there always exists a tie-breaking rule such that mixed Nash equilibria exist \[[@CR22]\].

Definition 1 {#FPar1}
------------
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                \begin{document}$$v: 2^{[m]}\rightarrow {\mathbb {R}}$$\end{document}$ be a valuation function. Then *v* is called *(a) additive*, if $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$v(S)=\sum _{j\in S} v(\{j\});$$\end{document}$ *(b) submodular*, if $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$v(S\cup T)+v(S\cap T)\le v(S)+v(T);$$\end{document}$ *(c) fractionally subadditive* or *XOS*, if *v* is determined by a finite set of additive valuations $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$v(S)= \max _{k} \xi _k(S)$$\end{document}$.

The classes of the above valuations are in increasing order of inclusion.

*Multi-Unit Auction* In a multi-unit auction, *m* copies of an item are sold to *n* bidders. Here, bidder *i* 's valuation is a function that depends on the number of copies he gets. That is $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$v_i: \{0, 1,\dots , m\} \rightarrow {\mathbb {R}}^+$$\end{document}$ and it is non-decreasing and normalized, with $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$v_i(0) = 0$$\end{document}$. We say a valuation $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$v_i$$\end{document}$ is *submodular*, if it has non-increasing marginal values, i.e. $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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*Nash Equilibrium and Price of Anarchy* We use $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$b_i$$\end{document}$ to denote a pure strategy of player *i* which might be a single value or a vector, depending on the auction. So, for the case of *m* simultaneous auctions, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$b_i=(b_{i1},\ldots ,b_{im})$$\end{document}$. We denote by $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\mathbf {b}_{-i}=(b_1,\ldots ,b_{i-1},b_{i+1},\ldots ,b_n)$$\end{document}$ the strategies of all players except for *i*. Any *mixed strategy* $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$B_i$$\end{document}$ of player *i* is a probability distribution over pure strategies.
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                \begin{document}$$\mathbf {X}(\mathbf {b})$$\end{document}$ denotes the allocation under the strategy profile $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\mathbf {b}$$\end{document}$. The valuation of player *i* for the allocation $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$v_i(\mathbf {X}(\mathbf {b}))=v_i(\mathbf {b})$$\end{document}$. The *utility* $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$u_i(\mathbf {X}(\mathbf {b}))=u_i(\mathbf {b})=v_i(\mathbf {b})-p_i(\mathbf {b})$$\end{document}$.
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*(Nash equilibrium)* A bidding profile $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\mathbf {B}=\times _i B_i$$\end{document}$ is a mixed Nash equilibrium if for all bids $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\mathbb {E}_{\mathbf {b}\sim \mathbf {B}}[u_i(\mathbf {b})]\ge \mathbb {E}_{\mathbf {b}_{-i}\sim \mathbf {B}_{-i}}[u_i(b'_i,\mathbf {b}_{-i})]$$\end{document}$. Clearly, any pure Nash equilibrium is also a mixed Nash equilibrium.

Our global objective is to maximize the sum of the valuations of the players for their received allocations, i.e., to maximize the *social welfare* $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\max _i b_i$$\end{document}$. We also refer to the maximum payment as the *maximum bid*.
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                \begin{document}$${\mathcal {I}}$$\end{document}$ includes the instances for every set of bidders and items and any possible valuation functions. The mixed price of anarchy, PoA, of a mechanism is defined as$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$I \in {\mathcal {I}}$$\end{document}$. The pure PoA is defined as above but restricted in the class of pure Nash equilibria.
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Combinatorial Auctions {#Sec5}
======================

In this section we prove an upper bound of 1.82 for the mixed price of anarchy of simultaneous all-pay auctions when bidders' valuations are fractionally subadditive. This result improves over the previously known bound of 2 due to \[[@CR23]\]. The proof itself might be of independent interest because we develop several structural properties of the mixed Nash equilibria. We first state our main theorem and present the key ingredients. Then we prove these ingredients in the following subsections.

Proof Outline {#Sec6}
-------------

Here we present a (very short) sketch of the proof highlights of the upper bound.

### Theorem 1 {#FPar4}

The mixed PoA for simultaneous all-pay auctions with fractionally subadditive bidders is at most 1.82.
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### Proposition 1 {#FPar5}
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The bound 1.82 can be derived by an optimal convex combination of these two lower bounds for $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Full Proof {#Sec7}
----------

### Proof {#FPar6}
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Proof of Inequality ([1](#Equ1){ref-type=""}) {#Sec8}
---------------------------------------------

This section is devoted to the proof of the following lower bound.

### Lemma 1 {#FPar7}
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### Proof {#FPar8}
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Proof of Inequality ([2](#Equ2){ref-type=""}) {#Sec9}
---------------------------------------------

In this section, we prove the following lemma for any mixed Nash equilibrium $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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First we show a useful lemma that holds for fractionally subadditive valuations.
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We will use the following technical proposition.

### Proposition 2 {#FPar12}
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### Lemma 4 {#FPar13}
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*Proof of the claim*: Notice that$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\begin{aligned} \frac{g'_i}{G'_i}=\frac{g_i/r}{G_i/r}=\frac{g_i}{G_i} \text {,} \quad \frac{g'_j}{G'_j}=\frac{rg_j}{rG_j}=\frac{g_j}{G_j} \quad \text {and} \quad \forall s \ne i,j \text {,} \quad G'_s = G_s \quad \text {and} \quad g'_s = g_s. \end{aligned}$$\end{document}$$Therefore, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
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                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
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                \begin{document}$$\forall s \ne i,j$$\end{document}$, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
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                \begin{document}$$H_s(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g})=H_s(\mathbf {G}', \mathbf {g}')$$\end{document}$. So, we only need to show that $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$H_i(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g})+H_j(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g}) > H_i(\mathbf {G}',\mathbf {g}')+H_j(\mathbf {G}',\mathbf {g}')$$\end{document}$.$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\begin{aligned}&H_i(\mathbf {G}',\mathbf {g}')+H_j(\mathbf {G}',\mathbf {g}')\\&\quad =\frac{g'_i(x)}{\sum _{t=1,t\ne i}^n\frac{g'_t(x)}{G'_t(x)}} + \frac{g'_j(x)}{\sum _{t=1,t\ne j}^n\frac{g'_t(x)}{G'_t(x)}}\\&\quad =\frac{g_i(x)/r}{\sum _{t=1,t\ne i}^n\frac{g_t(x)}{G_t(x)}} + \frac{rg_j(x)}{\sum _{t=1,t\ne j}^n\frac{g_t(x)}{G_t(x)}}\\&\quad = \frac{H_i(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g})}{r} + rH_j(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g})\\&\quad = \left( \frac{1}{r}-1\right) H_i(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g}) + (r-1)H_j(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g}) + H_i(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g})+H_j(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g})\\&\quad \le \left( \frac{1}{r}-1\right) r^2H_j(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g}) + (r-1)H_j(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g}) + H_i(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g})+H_j(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g})\\&\quad = -\left( r-1\right) ^2H_j(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g}) + H_i(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g})+H_j(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g})\\&\quad < H_i(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g})+H_j(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g}). \end{aligned}$$\end{document}$$In the above inequalities we used that $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$r^2\le \frac{H_i(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g})}{H_j(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g})}$$\end{document}$. The claim contradicts the assumption that $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$H(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g})$$\end{document}$ is the minimum, so the lemma holds. $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \usepackage{amssymb} 
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                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\square $$\end{document}$

### Lemma 6 {#FPar16}

Under constraints ([5](#Equ5){ref-type=""}), if $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
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                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\mathbf {G}$$\end{document}$ and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
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                \begin{document}$$\mathbf {g}$$\end{document}$ minimize $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
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                \begin{document}$$H(\cdot ,\cdot )$$\end{document}$, then for every $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$G_i = G_j =1$$\end{document}$, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$g_i=g_j.$$\end{document}$

### Proof {#FPar17}

For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there exist $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
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                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
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                \begin{document}$$G_i = G_j =1$$\end{document}$ such that $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$g_i \ne g_j$$\end{document}$. We will prove that for $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\mathbf {g}' = (\frac{g_i+g_j}{2},\frac{g_i+g_j}{2},g_{-ij})$$\end{document}$ (i.e. for every $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$k \ne i , j$$\end{document}$, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$g'_k = g_k$$\end{document}$, and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$g'_i=g'_j= \frac{g_i+g_j}{2}$$\end{document}$), $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$H(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g})> H(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g}')$$\end{document}$.

Notice that for every $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$k \ne i , j$$\end{document}$, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$H_k(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g}') = H_k(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g})$$\end{document}$, since $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$g_i+g_j=g'_i+g'_j$$\end{document}$ and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$G_i = G_j =1$$\end{document}$. Hence it is sufficient to show that $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$H_i(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g})+H_j(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g}) \ge H_i(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g}')+H_j(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g}')$$\end{document}$. Let $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
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                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$A_{ij} = \sum _{t \ne j,t\ne i}\frac{g_t}{G_t}$$\end{document}$.$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \usepackage{upgreek}
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                \begin{document}$$\begin{aligned}&H_i(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g}) + H_j(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g}) - H_i(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g}') - H_j(\mathbf {G},\mathbf {g}')\\&\quad = \frac{g_i}{g_j + A_{ij}} +\frac{g_j}{g_i + A_{ij}} - \frac{g_i}{\frac{g_i+g_j}{2} + A_{ij}} - \frac{g_j}{\frac{g_i+g_j}{2} + A_{ij}}\\&\quad = \frac{g_i}{g_j + A_{ij}} +\frac{g_j}{g_i + A_{ij}} - \frac{2g_i+2g_j}{g_i+g_j + 2A_{ij}} \\&\quad =g_i\frac{(g_i+A_{ij})((g_i+g_j+2A_{ij}) - 2(g_j+A_{ij}))}{(g_j + A_{ij})(g_i + A_{ij})(g_i+g_j + 2A_{ij})}\\&\qquad +\,g_j\frac{(g_j+A_{ij})((g_i+g_j+2A_{ij}) - 2(g_i+A_{ij}))}{(g_j + A_{ij})(g_i + A_{ij})(g_i+g_j + 2A_{ij})}\\&\quad =\frac{g_i(g_i+A_{ij})(g_i-g_j)+g_j(g_j+A_{ij})(g_j-g_i)}{(g_j + A_{ij})(g_i + A_{ij})(g_i+g_j + 2A_{ij})}\\&\quad =\frac{(g_i-g_j)(g^2_i - g_j^2 + A_{ij}(g_i-g_j))}{(g_j + A_{ij})(g_i + A_{ij})(g_i+g_j + 2A_{ij})}\\&\quad =\frac{(g_i-g_j)^2(g_i + g_j + A_{ij})}{(g_j + A_{ij})(g_i + A_{ij})(g_i+g_j + 2A_{ij})} > 0, \end{aligned}$$\end{document}$$which contradicts the assumption that $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\mathbf {G}$$\end{document}$ and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
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                \begin{document}$$\mathbf {g}$$\end{document}$ minimize $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$H(\cdot ,\cdot )$$\end{document}$. $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
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### Lemma 7 {#FPar18}

If $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$H_i=H_j$$\end{document}$, then:$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$g_i=g_j \Leftrightarrow G_i=G_j$$\end{document}$,$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$(g_i=rg_j>0 \text { and } r\ge 1) \Rightarrow G_i \ge r^2G_j$$\end{document}$.

### Proof {#FPar19}

Let $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$A_{ij} = \sum _{t \ne j,t\ne i}\frac{g_t}{G_t}$$\end{document}$; then $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$H_i = \frac{g_i}{\frac{g_j}{G_j}+A_{ij}}$$\end{document}$. By assumption:$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\begin{aligned} \frac{g_i}{\frac{g_j}{G_j}+A_{ij}}= & {} \frac{g_j}{\frac{g_i}{G_i}+A_{ij}}\\ \frac{g_i^2}{G_i} + g_iA_{ij}= & {} \frac{g^2_j}{G_j} + g_jA_{ij}\\ (g_i- g_j)A_{ij}= & {} \frac{g^2_j}{G_j} - \frac{g_i^2}{G_i}. \end{aligned}$$\end{document}$$If $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
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                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
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                \usepackage{upgreek}
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                \begin{document}$$g_i = g_j$$\end{document}$ then $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \usepackage{wasysym} 
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                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
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                \usepackage{amsbsy}
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                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$G_i=G_j$$\end{document}$.

If $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
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                \usepackage{upgreek}
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                \usepackage{upgreek}
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                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$A_{ij}G_i > 0$$\end{document}$ and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$g_i,g_j> 0$$\end{document}$, so $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$g_i-g_j=0$$\end{document}$ which results in $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$g_i=g_j$$\end{document}$.
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### Lemma 8 {#FPar20}

For *n*, *k* integers, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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### Proof {#FPar21}

We distinguish between two cases, (1) $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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### Proof {#FPar22}

(Proposition [1](#FPar5){ref-type="sec"})
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We are now ready to proceed with the proof of Lemma [2](#FPar9){ref-type="sec"}. Recall that $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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### Definition 4 {#FPar23}
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### Lemma 9 {#FPar24}
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### Proof {#FPar25}
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### Definition 5 {#FPar26}
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Next, by using the above lemma, we are able to show several structural results for Nash equilibria.
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### Lemma 13 {#FPar34}
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### Proof of Lemma 2 {#FPar46}
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Proof of Inequality ([4](#Equ4){ref-type=""}) {#Sec10}
---------------------------------------------

In this section we prove the following technical lemma.

### Lemma 19 {#FPar47}
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### Lemma 20 {#FPar48}
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### Proof {#FPar49}
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Now we are ready to proceed with the proof of Lemma [19](#FPar47){ref-type="sec"}.

### Proof of Lemma 19 {#FPar50}
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Multi-Unit Auctions {#Sec11}
===================

In this section, we propose a randomized all-pay mechanism for the multi-unit setting, where *m* identical items are to be allocated to *n* bidders. Markakis and Telelis \[[@CR18]\] and de Keijzer et al. \[[@CR14]\] have studied the price of anarchy for several multi-unit auction formats. The current best upper bound obtained was 1.58 for mixed Nash equilibria.

We propose a *randomized* all-pay mechanism that induces a *unique pure* Nash equilibrium, with an improved price of pnarchy bound of 4 / 3. We call the mechanism Random proportional-share allocation mechanism (PAM), as it is a randomized version of Kelly's celebrated proportional-share allocation mechanism for divisible resources \[[@CR15]\]. The mechanism works as follows (illustrated as Mechanism [1](#Sec11){ref-type="sec"}).
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We next show that the game induced by the Random PAM when the bidders have submodular valuations is *isomorphic* to the game induced by Kelly's mechanism for a single divisible resource when bidders have piece-wise linear concave valuations. For convenience, we review the definition of isomorphism between games as appears in Monderer and Shapley \[[@CR19]\].
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------------
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Theorem 2 {#FPar52}
---------

Any game induced by the Random PAM applied to the multi-unit setting with submodular bidders is *isomorphic* to a game induced from Kelly's mechanism applied to a single divisible resource with piece-wise linear concave functions.

Proof {#FPar53}
-----
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Fig. 2Illustration of the concave function. The *left part* of the figure depicts some submodular function *f*, while the *right part* depicts the modified concave function *g*. One can verify that *g* is concave if *f* is submodular

Given submodular functions $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$(f_i)_i$$\end{document}$, let $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$(g_i)_i$$\end{document}$ be the associated concave functions as defined in ([6](#Equ6){ref-type=""}). We can show the following equivalence between optimal welfares.

Lemma 21 {#FPar54}
--------
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Theorem [2](#FPar52){ref-type="sec"} and Lemma [21](#FPar54){ref-type="sec"}, allow us to obtain the existence and uniqueness of the pure Nash equilibrium, as well as the price of anarchy bounds of Random PAM by the corresponing results on Kelly's mechanism for a single divisible resource \[[@CR13]\]. Moreover, it can be shown that there are no other mixed Nash equilibria by adopting the arguments of \[[@CR5]\] for Kelly's mechanism. The main conclusion of this section is summarized in the following Corollary.

Corollary 1 {#FPar56}
-----------

Random PAM induces a *unique pure* Nash equilibrium when applied to the multi-unit setting with submodular bidders. Moreover, the price of anarchy of the mechanism is *exactly* 4 / 3.

Single Item Auctions {#Sec12}
====================

In this section, we study mixed Nash equilibria in a single item all-pay auction. First, in Sect. [5.1](#Sec13){ref-type="sec"} we measure the inefficiency of mixed Nash equilibria, showing tight results for the price of anarchy. Then in Sect. [5.2](#Sec14){ref-type="sec"}, we analyze the quality of two other important criteria, the *expected revenue (the sum of bids)* and the quality of the expected *highest submission (the maximum bid)*, which is a standard objective in crowdsourcing contests \[[@CR6]\]. For these objectives, we show a lower bound of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$v_2$$\end{document}$ is the second highest value among all bidders' valuations. In the following, we drop the word expected while referring to the revenue or to the maximum bid.

We quantify the loss of revenue and the highest submission in the worst-case equilibria. We show that the all-pay auction achieves a 2-approximation comparing to the conventional procurement (modeled as the first price auction), when considering worst-case mixed Nash equilibria; we show in Sect. [5.3](#Sec15){ref-type="sec"} that the revenue and the maximum bid of the conventional procurement equals $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$v_2$$\end{document}$ in the worst case. We also consider other structures of rewards allocation and conclude that allocating the entire reward to the highest bidder is the only way to guarantee the approximation factor of 2. Roughly speaking, allocating all the reward to the top prize is the optimal way to maximize the maximum bid and revenue among all the prior-free all-pay mechanisms where the designer has no prior information about the participants' skills.

Throughout this section we assume that the players are ordered based on decreasing order of their valuations, i.e. $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Social Welfare {#Sec13}
--------------

Our analysis is based on the characterization of the Nash equilibrium with single item by \[[@CR1]\]. En route, we also show the price of anarchy is 8 / 7 for auctions with two players.

### Theorem 3 {#FPar57}

The mixed price of anarchy of single item all-pay auction is at most 1.185.

### Proof {#FPar58}
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It has been shown in the proof of Theorem 2C in \[[@CR1]\], that $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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### Theorem 4 {#FPar59}

The mixed price of anarchy of single item all-pay auction is at least 1.185.
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Revenue and Maximum Bid {#Sec14}
-----------------------

In this section we bound the revenue and the maximum bid of the single-item all-pay auction, for the case of mixed Nash equilibria. Specifically, the revenue and the maximum bid have value of at least $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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### Theorem 5 {#FPar61}

In any mixed Nash equilibrium of the single-item all-pay auction, the revenue and the maximum bid are at least half of the second highest valuation.

### Proof {#FPar62}
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### Lemma 22 {#FPar63}

There exists a mixed Nash equilibrium of the single-item all-pay auction, where the revenue converges to $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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### Proof {#FPar64}
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Finally, the next theorem indicates that allocating the entire reward to the highest bidder is the best choice. In particular a prior-free all-pay mechanism is presented by a probability vector $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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### Theorem 6 {#FPar65}

For any prior-free all-pay mechanism that assigns the item to the highest bidder with probability strictly less than 1, i.e. $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Conventional Procurement {#Sec15}
------------------------

In this section we give bounds on the expected revenue and maximum bid of the single-item first-price auction. In the following, we just write revenue and maximum bid instead of expected revenue and expected maximum bid, respectively.

### Theorem 7 {#FPar67}

In any mixed Nash equilibrium, the revenue and the maximum bid lie between the two highest valuations. There further exists a tie-breaking rule, such that in the worst-case, these quantities match the second highest valuation (This can also be achieved, under the no-overbidding assumption).

### Lemma 23 {#FPar68}
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### Lemma 24 {#FPar70}

In any mixed Nash equilibrium, if *v* is the highest valuation, any player with valuation strictly less than *v* has expected utility equal to 0.

### Proof {#FPar71}

In \[[@CR8]\] (Theorem 5.4), they proved that the price of anarchy of mixed Nash equilibria, for the single-item first-price auction, is exactly 1. This means that the player(s) with the highest valuation gets the item with probability 1. Therefore, any player with valuation strictly less than *v* gets the item with zero probability and hence, her expected utility is 0. $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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### Lemma 25 {#FPar72}
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### Corollary 2 {#FPar74}
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### Lemma 26 {#FPar76}
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Otherwise, consider the tie-breaking rule that allocates the item equiprobably. Then for $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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